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Philanthropic Partnerships: The Theory of the Commons 
 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
 
Partnerships, or joint lines of action by two or more independent actors, 
will always be a stable characteristic of the nonprofit, philanthropic and 
voluntary action worlds.  We are often hard pressed, however, to find just the 
right words (or sometimes, any  suitable words) to talk about such 
partnerships.  We often find ourselves forced to stumble when characterizing 
such ventures as "philanthropic" or "charitable" or the recent favorite, "not-
for-profit". 
Such hesitancy is due more to the general inadequacies of existing 
"nonprofit" theory than to any personal linguistic inadequacies.   In its 
present state, nonprofit theory is largely the creation of committees of 
lawyers and accountants concerned only with a very narrow band questions.  
The rather remarkable fact is that "nonprofit theory" is largely unconnected 
to any larger body of social, psychological, political or economic theory.  (Just 
try finding "nonprofit" in the index of any theory text in any discipline, and 
you will discover the problem.)  Much current concern boils down to trying to 
find or invent connections of this sort.  While nonprofit theory largely handles 
immediate liability or fiduciary questions, there is no reason to suspect that 
derivative notions of nonprofit organization can adequately serve more 
general purposes (even if we rename them "not-for-profit" organizations).  
The labels are not the issue; the problem runs deeper than that. 
Yet, the contemporary philanthropic world has been reluctant to embrace 
any substitute universal summary terms to describe or characterize the full 
range of concerns covered by concerns of philanthropy, development, 
endowment, charity, not-for-profit, voluntary, independent, institutional, (or 
even that nineteenth century legislative favorite, eleemosynary).  For reasons 
set forth at length elsewhere, I have argued for a conceptual and semantic 
model grounded in the ordinary English noun commons  and the associated 
adjectival term common  (as in "the common good").*   
Commons theory possesses sufficient integrative power to bring some 
measure of semantic and conceptual order to the jumble of words which 
stymies all of us when talking about what we do and what we intend.  All 
manner of donative, voluntary action and "nonprofit" organization can be 
described in terms of commons and common goods. 
From this vantage point, the philanthropic partnerships of the late 20th 
century American "nonprofit sector" can be seen as variants of the much 
broader and richer phenomenon of the commons, reaching back hundreds of 
years and relating the giving and organized cooperative ventures of many 
 2 
different cultures.  Islamic foundations (waqfs ), mutual aid norms in rural 
Chinese villages, or medieval Japanese Buddhist fund raising (kanjin ) 
campaigns are part of the same broad continuum of giving and sharing as 
modern foundations and fund-raising practices.  In a real sense any commons 
represents a kind of philanthropic partnership, and any such partnership can 
be treated as a commons.   
Although the term "commons" comes closest in my estimation to 
representing the full range of these core ideas in English, most of the worlds 
languages contain similar terms to express formally or informally organized 
practices of giving, sharing and positive reciprocation (as opposed to negative 
reciprocation like vengeance).  In a world suddenly grown smaller, one of our 
challenges is to find and explore the great similarities and differences of 
connotation between these terms.   
In Anglo-American traditions, the concept of a commons has historically 
been most frequently attached to shared land in joint use by a village or 
community.  (E.g., the historic Boston Commons)  Because churches, schools, 
fire halls, community centers and other donative and voluntaristic 
institutions were often housed on or adjoining such common land, many 
similiarities in word and deed have evolved.   
Over the past couple of decades, the term commons has achieved more 
logically and mathematically precise meanings among academic theorists 
concerned with mathematical models of rational choice, and among biologists 
and environmentalists in the wake of Garrett Hardin's essay on "The 
Tragedy Of the Commons", which dealt with the overutilization of publicly 
available resources.  In the process, the basic connotations of the term have 
remained largely intact. 
We can begin to get a greater sense of the potentials of commons 
theory/terminology by asking the following question:  If the not-for-profit 
world is termed, following the Filer commission,  the "third" sector, of what 
does its "thirdness" consist?  The labels nonprofit, not-for-profit and non-
governmental organization (NGO) identify the first and second sectors by 
implication and tell us what the third sector is not.  Such negations are not, 
in themselves, very interesting:  Lettuce is also not an animal, and red is not 
green.  They are, however, our current starting point. 
In my view, what is unique about the third sector is that it is the sector of 
commons in the same sense that the market is the sector of firms and the 
state is the sector of public bureaucracies.  Further, I believe that a commons 
can usefully be defined as a group of people whose actions together are 
characterized by voluntary (that is, uncoerced  ) participation;  a sense of 
shared purpose  ; some measure of shared or pooled resources(whether 
common land, a shared treasury or some other endowment); a feeling of 
mutual regard  and concern for one another; and a desire to treat one another 
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with basic fairness.  The assumption that our philanthropic and charitable 
concerns ought to function as commons in this way is woven very deeply into 
the diverse legal and institutional frameworks which enable development 
and philanthropy.   
The commons, in this broad sense, is a category which covers the full 
range of informal, ad hoc  groups as well as formal (and incorporated) social 
organizations which share distinctive patterns of participation, purpose, 
resources, norms of reciprocity and social relations.  Particular commons, in 
this sense, include religious activities of all types, basic research, the arts, 
amateur athletics, charitable concerns for the poor, homeless, children and 
the aged, and the myriad other activities and projects of collective 
philanthropic partnership people can conjure up.  Some of them are formal 
organizations (associations), even nonprofit corporations.  Others may be 
more informal social arrangements like the traditional patron-client 
partnership, or the familiar modern triad of patron, client and development 
professional.   
Applying the proper noun commons to what has already been 
characterized as the third sector and nonprofit activity, however, is not as 
interesting as what begins to happen when we apply the adjective form to the 
shared purposes and resources of philanthropic partnerships.  At this level, 
the theory of the commons begins to bridge the enormous gaps which have 
grown up between "materialist" and "idealist" (or "spiritualist") conceptions of 
charitable and philanthropic endeavors. 
Following conventional economic usage, we can generally speak of the 
goals, or desired outcomes, of philanthropic partnerships as "goods."  
Although there has been much discussion of the fact that philanthropy may 
result in the private production of public goods, it has been less widely noted 
that not all philanthropic goods are public in any meaningful sense (loosely 
defined as being of interest to everyone.)  A second class of equally interesting 
philanthropic goods are those of particular interest only to a subset of the 
general public.   
(This introduces an interesting set of problems, since the term "common 
good" has been historically used by some political theorists in much the same 
sense as "public good."  Conceptually, however, it is relatively easy to make a 
distinction between common goods (plural) and The Common (or public) 
Good.  Interestingly, such a distinction exposes to examination the intent of a 
variety of philanthropic partnerships to cast their particular interests (and 
goods) as public good.  An association of stamp collectors, for example, may 
view creation of a national office of philately (which serves their common 
good) as serving the public interest, while others might disagree. 
There may also be a need to create some entirely new words to serve our 
purposes.  "Nonprofit organizations" will not suffice, for example, because it 
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suggests we know to be untrue: that somehow all benefactions (a very ancient 
English word, indeed!) are or must be formally organized.  Yet, there is no 
term which seems to imply the full range of formal and informal "good 
doings".  By analogy with the private production of tangible goods (a.k.a., 
manufacturing) which is ordinarily done in factories (once known as 
"manufactories") using various factors of production,  the philanthropic 
production of various common goods (a.k.a., benefactions) is done by a 
network of formally and informally organized benefactories , which includes 
schools, museums, social agencies, foundations, and assorted other tax-
exempt and nonprofit entities. 
Similarly, there is the issue of adequate words for the factors of 
production which go into benefaction, or producing benefits.  Certainly, 
money and economic goods and services are always fundamentally important 
types of common resource.  At the opposite extreme and equally important is 
what I call, following the philosophers of science, a paradigm : the network of 
related ideas, values and world-views which gives coherence to any type of 
common activity.  This is merely a systematic way of restating a truth known 
to benefactories everywhere :  It doesn't matter how good your ideas are if 
you have no resources to implement them; and it doesn't matter how much 
money you've got, if you don't have good ideas about what to do with it. 
In between the treasury and paradigm of a commons fall two other 
important categories of resources:  collections  of objects, held jointly by the 
commons.  Museum collections, religious accouterments and scientific 
apparatus are among the clearest examples of such collections.  Whether the 
religious icons of a congregation or the ritual regalia of a college fraternity, 
collections are composed of physical objects whose meaning and value for the 
members of the commons transcend considerations of price.  In a narrow 
accounting sense, collections often parallel inventory .  However, to the 
members of a commons, collections are the objects which must be kept but 
which cannot be priced.  Creating and maintaining a collection of sacred, 
beautiful, historical or other valued objects is one of the most consistent bases 
for forming and continuing commons. 
Finally, a fourth important category of resources I term (after 
conventional theatrical and musical usages) the common repertory .  In a real 
sense, the repertory of a theater company (or of an orchestra or a school of 
painters) is not simply its collections of scripts, props, canvases and paints, 
but the also the particular skills (in inflection, brush stroke, and the like) 
which members of a commons bring to their central tasks.   Expanding the 
range of discrete, separate repertories is often among the strongest 
motivations for philanthropic partnerships. 
The theory of the commons assumes that common actions in philanthropic 
partnerships are based on certain shared assumptions:  such partnerships 
consist fundamentally of social action , in which different persons coordinate 
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their behavior by what they interpret others as doing or planning; everyone 
involved is not currently starving nor under threat of actual physical 
violence;  people's actions are authentic  in a philosophical sense, and can be 
taken at face value; common acts by the partners will have a certain 
continuity  over time, and not be a matter entirely of the moment; common 
actions will be rational , especially in the larger sense of being related to a 
life plan; common acts will be possessed of a certain universality , such that 
actors in a wide variety of contexts and cultures will recognize the essential 
elements of the partnership; actors in such a philanthropic partnership will 
also ordinarily strive for some measure of autonomy  in their joint actions, 
even if it is necessary to keep the partnership secret as a result.  Finally, a 
consequence of striving to act independently and assertively, philanthropic 
partnerships will also devise their own standards  and values--of success and 
other evaluations.   If any of these assumptions is violated, or even suspect, 
the joint action of the partnership can be expected to cease while the terms of 
the partnership are renegotiated. 
In this any many other ways, "commons theory" seems to offer a suitable 
medium for expressing the most central and important ideas of charitable 
and philanthropic practices and values.  Once we begin to step aside from the 
recent and ungrounded model of nonprofit theory with its peculiar 
predilections, we begin to see that it is not limits on liability and fiduciary 
responsibility, but voluntarily shared purposes and resources, and a sense of 
mutuality and fair play which really characterize our deepest hopes and 
aspirations when we enter into philanthropic partnerships with others. 
_______________ 
*Dr. Lohmann is Professor of Social Work and Director of the Nonprofit Management 
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